I. INTRODUCTION
Recent empirical evidence suggests that sexual violence is increasingly becoming a phenomenon of armed confl ict. There is a causal link between armed confl ict and sexual violence: armed confl ict results in casualties and many of those casualties tend to include women who have been sexually violated. The occurrence of sexual violence during armed confl ict necessitates a reaction from states in accordance with their obligations under international law. This article examines the phenomenon of sexual violence in armed confl ict in Africa and the international legal framework dealing with this problem.
There is a long history of sexual violence during armed confl ict. For example, during World War II in occupied Europe thousands of women were subjected to rape and thousands more were forced to enter brothels for Nazi troops. 1 In addition, thousands of Korean women were forced by the Japanese army to work as 'comfort' women in Japanese army brothels. Only in 1992 did some Japanese leaders apologise for this practice. 2 Further, about 900 000 German women are estimated to have been raped by Russian forces in Berlin during the fi nal days of World War II, 3 and about 20 000 Chinese women were raped in Nanking following the Japanese takeover of the city in 1937. 4 It is estimated that about 20 000 women were raped during the armed confl ict in the former Yugoslavia. These women were raped by the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim military groups, structures reinforced. 13 From time immemorial women were regarded as virtual property and often enjoyed no legal capacity.
14 Consequently, rape committed by a member of a community was considered an injury to the male estate and the community, not to the woman in question. 15 . Hence, the license to rape was considered a major incentive for the soldier involved in siege warfare. 16 The protection of women from sexual violence is a (human) right. 17 The protection and realisation of human rights is the responsibility of individual states, but international instruments, institutions and structures are indispensable to ensure the fulfi lling of this duty. 18 Therefore, international obligations exist at basically at two levels, namely, the global level under the auspices of the United Nations system, and at the regional level such as in Africa, 19 Europe 20 and the Americas. 21 Europe and the Americas human rights regional systems have received wide acceptance.
While the African regional system has been criticised for its inadequacy, 22 however, this article will demonstrate that Africa is making a signifi cant contribution to the development of international law on sexual violence during armed confl ict. First, I will explore the concept of sexual violence during armed confl ict and the status of such violence under international law. I will then analyse international law protecting women from sexual violence during armed confl ict and the jurisprudence of the international tribunals. Further, I will examine the obligations of states under international law. Finally, I will look at Africa's regional system to ascertain the role Africa plays in constructing a legal framework to protect women from sexual violence during armed confl ict. I will particularly look at the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Charter), 23 the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Women's Protocol) 24 Constitutive Act of the African Union 25 as well as the enforcement mechanisms such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission) 26 and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Court).
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II. THE CONCEPT OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING ARMED CONFLICT
Sexual violence during armed confl ict usually does not involve a single isolated act, but it involves widespread and/or systematic acts, where a group of women are sexually assaulted because they belong to the opposition. The single isolated act is usually outside the scope of 'war' 28 and occurs during peacetime. This type of sexual violence is prosecuted in the domestic courts rather than in the international sphere. Systematic and widespread acts of sexual violence, however, are understood to mean acts 'carried out during the course of a systematic (and widespread) commission of physical, mental, and/or sexual violence'.
29
The term 'systematic' means that an act is 'thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy using substantial public or private resources'. 30 However, an isolated act can constitute systematic and/or widespread act where there is a link between such an isolated act and the systematic and/or widespread acts. 31 This means that if the isolated act fi ts into the plan of the systematic and widespread acts, then such an isolated act will constitute systematic and/or widespread act. This article is based on sexual violence during armed confl ict, which is widespread and/or systematic.
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides for the forms of sexual violence to include '… rape, sexual slavery, enforced sterilisation or any [other] form of sexual violence …' 33 This article deals with rape and other forms of sexual violence as mentioned in the statute of the Rome Statute. The term 'sexual violence' will be used in the course of this article to refer broadly to all forms of sexual violence. Among the instruments that were infl uenced by the Lieber Code were the Hague Convention of 1899 37 and 1907, 38 which provided that family honour and rights, individual lives and property, as well as religious convictions and liberty must be respected, but never referred expressly to sexual violence or rape. 39 The protection of 'family honour and rights' is argued to have been a euphemism of the time, which encompasses a prohibition of rape and sexual assault, and this provision is mandatory. 40 The Geneva Conventions do not explicitly mention rape or sexual violence as constituting 'grave breaches'. 41 Women are also afforded protection from sexual violence during armed confl ict under the international human rights treaties. The application of human rights treaties does not cease during armed confl ict, instead they apply hand in hand with the treaties dealing with international humanitarian law. 47 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 48 The Universal Declaration also prohibits slavery and all forms of slave trade as well as torture and inhuman treatment. 49 In addition, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 50 provides for the 'right and security of the person and protection against violence or bodily harm, whether infl icted by government offi cials or by any individual group or institution'. 51 Women (CEDAW), 57 which is 'the defi nitive international legal instrument requiring respect for and observance of the human rights of women' 58 prohibits all gender-based discrimination that has the effect or purpose of impairing the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms. 59 Disappointingly, CEDAW does not refer to violence of any kind in its provisions. However, through the interpretation by the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 60 CEDAW prohibits discrimination and disparaging treatment on the basis of gender, including violence against women. 61 The General Recommendation 19 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 62 provides that the general prohibition of gender discrimination includes 'gender-based violence -that is, violence that is directed at a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately'. It includes acts that 'infl ict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty …'
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Rape is also prohibited as a crime against humanity and a war crime in the provisions of the statutes of the ICTY 64 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
65 Subsequent to the international criminal tribunals, the international community established the ICC, whose statute also criminalises sexual violence as a crime against humanity 66 and as a war crime. 67 The Rome Statute expands crimes against humanity to include explicitly other forms of sexual violence other than rape. 68 Other crimes enumerated within crimes against humanity, which have a particular application to women, are crimes such as 71 Furthermore, article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, which concerns internal armed confl ict, also uses the identical terms used in article 8(2)(b)(xxii) as serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. This, therefore, means that there is no doubt that sexual violence against women during armed confl ict is considered a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions as it will seem illogical to use identical terms that have different meanings.
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B. The role of the international criminal tribunals to develop international law on sexual violence during armed confl ict
Following the confl icts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where sexual violence against women was rampant, and acting in accordance with its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 73 the Security Council established the ICTY and the ICTR in order to 'maintain or restore international peace and security'. 74 Hence, the ICTY and the ICTR are the subsidiary organs of the Security Council. 75 Signifi cantly, when establishing the tribunals, the Security 69 The term 'enslavement' is defi ned as 'the exercise of any power attaching to the right of ownership over a person, including in the course of traffi cking in persons, in particular women and children'. See article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute. This defi nition elaborates upon the traditional defi nition of slavery encompassed in article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention which defi nes 'slavery' as 'the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised'. 70 The term 'torture' is defi ned to mean 'the intentional infl iction of severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused, except that torture shall not include pain and suffering arising out from inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions'. The Rome Statute has eliminated the Torture Convention requirement that the act 'by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public offi cial or other person acting in an offi cial capacity'. See article 7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute. It should be noted that the act of torture can constitute not only a crime against humanity, but also a war crime. Sexual violence has been found to constitute torture by the ICTY and the ICTR. 71 The term 'persecution' as a crime against humanity is defi ned as 'the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity'. See article 7 (2) Council considered sexual violence during armed confl ict as a threat to international peace and security. This means that sexual violence during armed confl ict is no longer seen as spoils of war. The trial chambers of the tribunals have pro secuted and convicted perpetrators of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Sexual violence as torture
Affi rming that sexual violence may constitute torture, the Trial Chamber in the Akayesu Judgment held that:
Like torture rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when infl icted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public offi cial or other person acting in an offi cial capacity.
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While, the Trial Chamber in the Celebici Judgment considered the rape of any person to be 'a despicable act which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity'. 77 It held that 'rape causes severe pain and suffering both physical and psychological … it is diffi cult to envisage circumstances in which rape by, or at the instigation of a public offi cial, could be considered as occurring for a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, coercion, discrimination or intimidation'.
78 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber held that 'whenever rape and other forms of sexual violence meet the aforementioned criteria, then they shall constitute torture, in the same manner as any other act that meets the criteria'.
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In the Furundzija Judgment, the Trial Chamber not only stated that rape can amount to torture, it also related an act of rape to a violation of human dignity and physical integrity of women. 80 Although the Trial Chamber acknowledged that like torture, rape may be used to obtain information, it may also be used against women because of their gender. 81 Further, the Trial Chamber considered humiliating the victim as one of the possible purposes of torture, which is prohibited by the general spirit of international humanitarian law whose primary purpose is to safeguard human dignity. 82 It held that the notion of humiliation is 'close to the notion of intimidation, which is explicitly referred to in the Torture Convention's defi nition'. 83 
Sexual violence as genocide
For an act of sexual violence to constitute genocide it has to satisfy one of the elements listed in the Genocide Convention. 84 Hence, the Trial Chamber held that for a crime of genocide to have been committed, that the particular act be committed against a specifi cally targeted group, it being national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 85 The Trial Chamber emphasised that the crime of genocide does not imply the actual extermination of a group in its entirety, but is understood as such once any one of the acts mentioned in article 2 (2) is committed with the specifi c intent to destroy 'in whole or in part'. 86 Hence, the Trial Chamber held that rape and sexual violence constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with a specifi c intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. 87 It held further that rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infl iction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even 'one of the worst ways of infl ict (sic) harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm'. 88 The Trial Chamber held that sexual violence was 'an integral part of the process of destruction, specifi cally targeting Tutsi women and specifi cally contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole'. 89 The Trial Chamber noted that 'the rape of Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women and solely against them'.
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Discussing the required element 'imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group', 91 the Trial Chamber stated that it should be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilisation, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages. 92 The Trial Chamber stated further that in patriarchal societies where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case, where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group. 93 This judgment is significant because for the fi rst time sexual violence was considered as genocide.
Sexual violence as a form of enslavement
For the fi rst time sexual violence was held to constitute crimes against humanity in the form of enslavement by the ICTY. In the Foca Judgment, the three accused were charged with violations of the laws or customs of war and with crimes against humanity, in particular, rape, torture, enslavement and outrages upon personal dignity. 94 The accused were alleged to have detained the victims, including a 12 year-old girl, in apartments where the victims had to perform household chores and were frequently raped by the accused.
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The Trial Chamber defi ned enslavement as a crime against humanity in customary international law to consist 'the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person'. 96 Hence it held that:
Under this defi nition, indications of enslavement include elements of control and ownership; the restriction or control of an individual's autonomy, freedom of choice or freedom of movement; and, often, the accruing of some gain to the perpetrator. The consent or free will of the victim is absent. It is often rendered impossible or irrelevant by, for example, the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion; the fear of violence, deception or false promises; the abuse of power; the victim's position of vulnerability; detention or captivity, psychological oppression or socio-economic conditions. Further indications of enslavement include exploitation, the exaction of forced or compulsory labour or service, often without remuneration and often, though not necessarily involving physical hardship, sex, prostitution, and human traffi cking. In addition and of signifi cance, the Trial Chamber held that the 'acquisition' or 'disposal' of someone for monetary or other compensation is not a requirement for enslavement. 98 The tribunals have developed international law on sexual violence during armed confl ict signifi cantly. Sexual violence can constitute international crimes that can be prosecuted successfully in the international forum, thus sending a clear message to the would-be perpetrators. There is no doubt that the tribunals will leave a rich legacy in the development of international law on sexual violence during armed confl ict.
IV. THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING ARMED CONFLICT
The prohibition of international crimes constitutes peremptory norms (jus cogens) of international law. 99 The doctrine of jus cogens presupposes that there are some rules, which are so fundamental to international law that states cannot derogate.
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These norms are recognised to have a superior status over other norms. 101 The doctrine of jus cogens in international law derives primarily from the Vienna Convention which defi nes jus cogens, in article 53 as '[a] peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognised by international community of states as a whole from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modifi ed only by a subsequent norm of a general international law having the same character'. 102 Since sexual violence constitutes crimes against humanity, 
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This statement by the ICJ gives rise to the obligations owed by a state towards the international community as a whole. If a state breaches such obligations it will have to be responsible to the whole community. 105 Hence, states bear the obligation to respect, ensure respect for, and to enforce norms of international human rights and humanitarian law that are incorporated in treaties to which they are parties, found in customary international law, and those that have been incorporated into their domestic legal system. 106 States are, therefore required to prevent sexual violence during armed confl ict; to stop the act when it is being committed; and to compensate victims of sexual violence during armed confl ict. Failure to do so will be a breach of the obligations erga omnes and the international community would be required to respond.
V. AFRICA'S HUMAN RIGHTS REGIONAL SYSTEM
A. From the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU)
The African leaders have replaced the OAU with the AU. 107 The OAU was established by the OAU Charter of 1963. 108 The OAU Charter neither made any express commitments to protect human rights generally and the achievement of gender equality in particular, as key objectives of the OAU. 109 This Charter emphasised the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states 110 and enjoined member states from interfering in internal affairs of other states. 111 As Chirwa puts it, '[t]he concern for human rights was, therefore, not one of the factors that led to the establishment of the OAU'. 112 In order to remedy the defects of the OAU, in 2000 the Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted the Constitutive Act, 113 which establishes the AU, a move, which was seen to be a fi rst step for Africa to ensure seriousness about human rights and to maintain peace, security and stability in Africa. 114 However, some sceptics have seen the move from the OAU to the AU as 'an old wine in a new wine skin' and that 'the AU is a reincarnation of the OAU'. As such, the AU 'is not likely to take human rights seriously'. 115 However, the Constitutive Act has provisions that clearly refer to human rights and armed confl ict in Africa. The Preamble to the Constitutive Act stipulates that African leaders are 'conscious of the fact that the scourge of confl icts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda'.
116 Therefore, they are 'determined to promote, protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law'.
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The AU has demonstrated that it takes gross human rights abuses seriously as article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides, as one of the principles of the Union, 'the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'. However, it is unclear whether the AU is prepared to exercise the right to humanitarian intervention based purely on sexual violence against women during armed confl ict. However, as I have argued elsewhere, 118 the law is clear that the AU may exercise the right to humanitarian intervention in cases of war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity. Sexual violence during armed confl ict constitutes such crimes.
B. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
The Charter indicates that African leaders for the fi rst time acknowledged that human rights violations are a matter of concern for the international community. 119 However, the Charter has been criticised for its conceptualisation of women's rights in its provisions. 120 Hence, it is necessary to look at the provisions of the Charter that provides protection to women to ascertain whether, if interpreted 'progressive[ly] and liberal[ly]' 121 they protect women from sexual violence during armed confl ict.
The Charter requires states to 'ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure protection of the rights of the woman and children as stipulated in international declarations and conventions'. 122 International declarations and conventions such as the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 123 and the CEDAW 124 prohibit sexual violence against women during armed confl ict. 125 Therefore, this provision, by referring to the international treaties, provides such protection to women. However, this provision protects women in the context of family, which is 'the natural unit and basis of the society'. 126 Hence, the Charter fails to envisage changes in the form of family and to take into consideration of the fact that women are individuals in their own right. 127 A signifi cant provision that can be said to specifi cally protect women from sexual violence during armed confl ict is article 5 which prohibits 'all forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment'. 128 As has been established above, sexual violence during armed confl ict constitutes slavery, inhuman acts and torture; this provision protects women from sexual violence during armed confl ict. Furthermore, on interpreting this provision the African Commis-sion on Human and Peoples' Rights 129 has stated that the protection against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment 'extends to the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental'. 130 In addition, Commission has stated that '[a]rticle 5 prohibits not only torture, but also cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. This includes not only actions which cause serious physical or psychological suffering, but which humiliate the individual or force him or her to act against his will or conscience'. 131 These decisions by the Commission are in line with the provisions of article 147 of the Geneva Convention IV. The Commentary 132 to this article provides a broad interpretation of inhuman treatment, which stipulates that '[t]he aim of the Convention is certainly to grant civilians in enemy hands a protection which will preserve their human dignity, and prevent them being brought down to the level of animals. That leads to the conclusion that by "inhuman treatment" the Convention does not mean only physical injury or injury to health,' it also includes rape and sexual violence. 133 Further, the decisions by the Commission are in line with the decisions of the international criminal tribunals as has been shown above. Therefore, even though the Commission has not dealt with a communication that involves sexual violence during armed confl ict as yet, this provision together with this interpretation by the Commission clearly protects women from sexual violence during armed confl ict. Hence, if interpreted 'liberal[ly] and progressive[ly]' 134 as above, the Charter does protect women from sexual violence during armed confl ict.
C. The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa 135
The Women's Protocol was adopted to remedy the defi ciencies of the Charter on the rights of women. Article 3 of the Women's Protocol provides that every woman has 'the right to dignity inherent in a human being' and 'to respect as a person and to the free development of her personality'. 136 In addition every woman is entitled to 'respect for her life and the integrity of her person'. 137 These provisions demonstrate that women are individuals in their own right. Further, the Women's Protocol also explicitly prohibits violence against women, something that is not expressly recognised by CEDAW. The Women's Protocol defi nes the term 'violence against women' to mean 'all acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace time and during situations of armed confl icts or of war'.
138 From this defi nition, it is clear that state parties undertake to protect women from sexual violence during armed confl ict.
The Women's Protocol goes further and stipulates that state parties undertake 'to protect asylum seeking women, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons against all forms of violence, rape and other forms of sexual exploitation', and 'to ensure that such acts are considered war crimes, genocide and/ or crimes against humanity'.
139 Whereas article 11 (2) provides that state parties 'shall protect civilians including women irrespective of the population to which they belong'. Therefore, the Women's Protocol reaffi rms the international law notion that sexual violence constitutes international crimes as stated in the Rome Statute and the statutes and judgments of the international criminal tribunals. Signifi cantly, the Women's Protocol is the only international treaty that prohibits and explicitly treats sexual violence during armed confl ict as genocide Article 11(1) of the Women's Protocol enjoins state parties 'to respect and ensure respect for the rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed confl ict situations, which affect the population, particularly women'. Furthermore, state parties 'undertake to protect … women, irrespective of the population to which they belong, in the event of armed confl ict'. 140 They will do so 'in accordance with the obligations incumbent upon them under international humanitarian law'. 141 In this instance, state parties are required to act in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols and any other international law treaty dealing with international humanitarian law to which they are party such as the Rome Statute, as well as customary international humanitarian law.
By criminalising sexual violence as war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity, the Protocol has followed in the footsteps of the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals. This is an important step taken by the African community to address sexual violence, which is prevalent in Africa during armed confl ict.
D. Refl ections on the role of the African Commission to protect women from sexual violence during armed confl ict
In order to ensure that state parties adhere to their obligations under the Charter, the Charter makes provisions to establish the African Commission 'to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection' in Africa. 142 It is therefore clear that the Commission has a dual mandate of promoting and protecting human and peoples' rights in terms of the Charter.
The Commission cannot award damages, restitution or compensation. It is also not empowered to condemn an offending state; it can only make recommendations to the parties. 143 The Commission's effectiveness in promoting and protecting human rights therefore depends, to a certain extent, upon whether the necessary support is provided by the AU. 144 For example, in order for the decisions of the Commission to be fi nal, they have to be adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU/AU. 145 Once the Assembly approves the decisions then the target state is obliged to act accordingly to the recommendations of the Commission. However, the Assembly has been criticised for not taking seriously the decisions of the Commission on human rights violations by the states, as no response has been forthcoming from the OAU despite several cases being submitted to it. 146 Ratifi cation of the Charter binds a state to its provisions under international law. 147 Article 1 of the Charter underlines the primary obligation of states to recognise the rights in the Charter. State parties undertake to recognise the rights by giving effect to the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. 148 The Commission has decided that:
Article 1 gives the Charter the legally binding character always attributed to international treaties of this sort. Therefore a violation of any provision of the Charter automatically means a violation of article 1. If a state party to the Charter fails to recognise the provisions of the same, there is no doubt that it is violation of this article. Its violation, therefore, goes to the root of the Charter. 149 States undertake to recognise the provisions of the Charter by adopting legislation and by 'other measures'. 150 One of the 'other measures' is that of abiding by the fi ndings of the Commission related to communications against a state.
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Hence, if states refuse to abide by the decisions of the Commission, the protective mandate of the Commission will be rendered meaningless.
The Commission has decided to play an active role in cases of massive violations of human rights, per article 58 of the Charter. 152 Therefore, the Commission has developed a mechanism for urgent response to human rights emergencies under article 58 of the Charter. 153 In its mechanism, the Commission or its bureau is required to act promptly in cases of human rights violations or emergency situations. 154 It will do so by conducting on-site visits, make diplomatic approaches and contact national and international organisations concerned with human rights. 155 The Commission has envisaged the lack of cooperation from states where massive human rights are alleged to have occurred. In such cases the Commission is to organise meetings near the state or its headquarters. 156 On the involvement of the AU, the Commission, per its Early Intervention Mechanism, is to report emergency situations to the Assembly as specifi ed by article 58. However, the Commission realises that the Assembly might not act promptly with regard to such reports. In this instance the Commission decided that it should, more specially, give publicity to the outbreak of emergencies and to its investigations.
157 ' The impact of such publicity on public opinion is a weapon that cannot be underestimated in the protection of human rights.' 158 The Commis-sion is, therefore, breaking away from the requirement that before it publishes its fi ndings it has to wait for the decision of the Assembly.
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E. The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa
In order to remedy some of its defects and to fulfi l its mandate the Commission has appointed six special rapporteurs including the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa (Special Rapporteur). 160 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur consists of, amongst others, conducting a study on the situation of the rights of women in Africa and to report to the Commission as well as any recommendations for the improvement of the situation of women's rights in Africa. 161 This mandate of the Special Rapporteur is wide and it does not specify how such mandate ought to be undertaken. This may lead the Special Rapporteur to concentrate on the study of women's rights that is of less signifi cance than the one which requires urgent attention. For example, it has been noted that the Special Rapporteur has been concentrating on the ratifi cation of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa. 162 While the ratifi cation of the Women's Protocol is important for the realisation of women's rights in Africa, other areas such as the prevalent sexual violence against women in the ongoing-armed confl ict are being ignored. The Special Rapporteur needs a clear mandate.
One of the diffi culties faced by the present Special Rapporteur is that the Commission proposed one of its own members to be a Special Rapporteur. 163 Appointing a commissioner as a special rapporteur, who is already swamped by her own work and that of the Commission, raises concerns on the abilities of the Special Rapporteur to fulfi l her duties. It is rightly argued that 'adding further burden to the commissioners who already only act on a part-time basis is wholly unrealistic, and compounded by their being required to function in areas which may be far removed from their full-time professional expertise'. 164 It is also argued that as long as the Commission appointed one of its own, the work of the special rapporteur would be impossible to be wholly separate from the work of a commissioner, which is sometimes quite broad. 165 In fact, it is argued, it is questionable how much signifi cance the act of appointing a special rapporteur from within the Commission has had. 166 The idea behind appointing special rapporteurs by the Commission is remarkable and it is what Africa needs in order to promote and protect human and peoples' rights for thematic purposes. However, with no clear indication of the mandate, lack of time and willingness by the appointed special rapporteurs, the work of the special rapporteurs may be ineffective. With right skills, funding, specifi c mandate and willingness on the part of the Special Rapporteur, her work can assist the Commission and other relevant AU institutions to protect women during armed confl ict. It is about time the Commission thought of appointing a Special Rapporteur from outside in order to fulfi l its mandate to protect and promote women's rights in Africa, especially during armed confl ict.
F. The African Court and the protection of women from sexual violence during armed confl ict
The initial absence of a court and other clear enforcement powers or decisionmaking procedures was considered to be one of the major shortcomings of the Charter, preventing states from being compelled, and jurisprudence from being made. A court was seen as a required solution to these problems by depoliticising the Commission and to provide fi nal binding judgments. 167 The African Court was established by the Protocol Additional to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. 168 The Court is established to complement and reinforce the functions of the African Commission. 169 The Court's jurisdiction extends 'to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratifi ed by the states concerned'.
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Article 7 further provides that 'the Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and any other human rights instrument ratifi ed by states concerned'.
171 When these provisions are compared to articles 60 and 61 of the Charter, where the Commission is required to merely look toward comparative and international human rights law when interpreting the provisions of the Charter, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the Court goes further than only applying the provisions of the Charter. Under the Protocol, the Court will exercise direct jurisdiction over all 'human rights instruments ratifi ed by the states concerned'. 172 Presumably, it is argued, this will extend to all regional, sub-regional, bilateral, multilateral and international treaties. 173 Udombana argues that this provision has extremely important implications. He gives an example of a perception and fear that has been expressed that the Charter 'does not adequately protect, or it could be used to abuse, women's rights'. He maintains that rather than relying on the Charter then an aggrieved woman or a group of women could bring a case to Court under another international treaty that better protected her rights. 174 However, Professor Heyns believes that 'other relevant' treaties would be treaties that make express provision for adjudication by the Court. 175 In other words, in his restrictive approach, besides the Charter and the Protocol to the Court, only the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa will be interpreted by the Court, as it is the only treaty, so far, that makes express provision for the jurisdiction of the Court. 176 However, the travaux prépara-toires 177 leave no doubt that this provision was intended to confer on the Court the power to apply treaties other than the Charter and Protocol.
The Court is empowered to offer remedies to victims of human rights violations 178 and to seek enforcement of its judgments against states. 179 Unlike the Commission, the Court has express powers to 'make appropriate orders to remedy the [gross] violation [of human rights], including the payment of fair compensation or reparation'. 180 By providing reparations to victims, the Court will not only assist in returning individuals to the status quo ante, but will serve as an important deterrent and educational role as well. 181 The Court may also take provisional measures in cases of extreme gravity or urgency to avoid irreparable harm. 182 These powers are of signifi cance in cases of massive human rights violations, including sexual violence, where the Court can grant provisional measures ordering the state party to refrain from committing massive human rights violations or to stop the ongoing massive human rights violations. Unlike the Commission, which is supposed to report to the Assembly about massive human rights violations and conduct an in depth study at the request of the Assembly, 183 the Court has been given powers to deal with the matter promptly.
The Protocol provides that state parties 'undertake to comply' with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution. 184 At the same time, the Court is required to specifi cally list those states that have failed to comply with its judgment in its annual reports to the AU. 185 The naming and shaming mechanism will have adverse implications to those state parties that fail to abide by the decisions of the Court. The Assembly, as the supreme organ of the AU, 186 has powers to deal with those states, which fail to adhere to their obligations under the Charter as well as any other relevant human rights instrument, including issuing sanctions to such states. 187 Furthermore, the Protocol provides that the execution of the orders of the Court shall be monitored by the Council of Ministers. 188 The African Charter did not grant these powers to the African Commission, this therefore shows that state parties, on paper, are serious about the effectiveness of the Court.
Signifi cantly, the Court is not constrained by the confi dentiality clause that has hindered the effectiveness of the Commission under article 59 of the Charter. It needs no authorisation from the Assembly to make its activities and judgments public and its proceedings are to be conducted in public. 189 Public exposure and authoritative condemnation of human rights violations is an extremely effective tool to promote and protect human rights.
Article 28 of the Protocol stipulates that the Court shall render its judgments within 90 days of having completed its deliberations. Such judgment, decided by the majority, shall be fi nal and not subject to appeal. This provision is remarkable because once the Court hands down its judgment then state parties are expected to act in accordance with its fi nding and ensure that they execute the judgment given accordingly. Therefore, the Court could be an effective mechanism in order to prevent and halt sexual violence during armed confl ict. 
VI. CONCLUSION
International law on rape and other forms of sexual violence has developed significantly in the last decade. Sexual violence during armed constitutes international crimes as has been evidenced by the judgments of the international criminal tribunals. The prohibition of international crimes has acquired the status of jus cogens which gives rise to obligations erga omnes. States are therefore obliged to act. The ICTR, which is based in Africa, will leave a rich legacy through the role it is playing in developing international law on sexual violence.
The African regional community has also followed suit on the protection of women from sexual violence by creating the African Charter and the Women's Protocol. The Charter, if interpreted liberally and progressively, does protect women from sexual violence during armed confl ict. However, the Charter does not take cognizance of the changing forms of family. The Women's Protocol criminalises sexual violence during armed confl ict as genocide as well as crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is also the fi rst international treaty to explicitly criminalise sexual violence as genocide. The Commission is also playing a role in the protection of women from sexual violence during armed confl ict. Member states, however, have to take the recommendations of the Commission seriously in accordance with their obligations under the Charter.
Another signifi cant feature of the Commission was to establish the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa. However, the Special Rapporteur needs a clear mandate in order to be effective in the protection of women from sexual violence during armed confl ict.
There is hope on the enforcement of human rights as the Court has come into force. The African Court not only has the binding effect, it is also required to interpret every human rights instrument ratifi ed by the state parties. This means that the aggrieved parties will have discretion to choose an instrument that would better protect their rights. The court may also take provisional measures in cases of extreme gravity or urgency to avoid irreparable harm. This means that it may order states to halt sexual violence during armed confl ict. It remains to be seen whether the African leaders will adhere to the decisions made by the Court.
There is no doubt that sexual violence during armed confl ict is a problem in Africa. However, the African human rights regional system has rich human rights instruments that prohibit sexual violence during armed confl ict. There are also mechanisms such as the African Commission (which includes the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women) and the African Court to deal with this issue. Hence, Africa is making a signifi cant contribution to the development of international law on rape and other forms of sexual violence during armed confl ict. What is lacking, however, is the implementation of these instruments. It is about time that African leaders take a stand to ensure their implementation to end sexual violence during armed confl ict.
